European standard

Position paper · Impulse Storm Ltd. · June 2026

A new European standard for fire suppression

Why the accelerated publication of the private NFPA and UL standards, without independent and reproducible system-level safety verification, makes the case for a new European standard developed together with the European Commission.

Germany — DIBt Finland — Pelastusopisto European Commission — DG GROW

Core thesis

Aerosol fire suppression in Europe and beyond rests, in normative terms, on a private United States standard — NFPA 2010 — above all through the UL 2775 certification standard, its principal vehicle, and through the derivative international standard ISO 15779, the European standard EN 15276 and commercial certification schemes. The procedural and technical sufficiency of that foundation is contested, and the safety of the system after discharge — discharge temperature, carbon monoxide and nitrogen-oxide concentrations, and conditions for evacuation — is not confirmed by any public European regime.

What is required is a European public standard, developed through the German Institute for Construction Technology (Deutsches Institut für Bautechnik, DIBt) along the route of a European Assessment Document (EAD), under the oversight of the European Commission. The work already rests on the institutions of Germany and Finland.

Todayprivate standard → component certificate → market access
RequiredEuropean standard → system-level verification → confirmed safety

The basis of this thesis is a documented divergence between the declared characteristics of condensed aerosol fire-suppression systems and the safety limits set by the very same standards, together with the procedural status of the underlying private standard NFPA 2010 (United States), on which the international standard ISO 15779 and the European standard EN 15276 are structurally built.

The initiative is not theoretical. The procedure for developing a European Assessment Document is already under way at the German Institute for Construction Technology (DIBt), and the only verifiable full-system comparative test was carried out by the Emergency Services Academy Finland (Pelastusopisto). The initiative therefore rests, from the outset, on the institutions of two member states of the European Union. This paper places it within two decades of European Union intervention in the standardisation system and closes with an invitation to partnership.

I

The problem: the shifting function of the standard

1.1 The loss of legitimacy of private standards

NFPA (the National Fire Protection Association) and UL (Underwriters Laboratories) are private organisations. Once incorporated by reference into the law of the European Union and the United States, their documents acquire binding force without passing through the procedural guarantees of public law. In 2016 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) expressly held that harmonised standards form “part of Union law”. From this follows a question of legitimacy: a text private in origin becomes law without a full public procedure.

Where the speed of publishing a standard outpaces reproducible technical verification, the function of safety control is displaced by the function of commercial circulation. The standard ceases to certify safety and begins to certify market access.

To this is added a lack of independence. UL — the body that certifies products to NFPA 2010 — is at the same time represented on the technical committee that develops that standard. The certifying party takes part in writing the very norm against which it certifies.

1.2 The internal contradiction of EN 15276

The European standard EN 15276 consists of two structurally uncoordinated parts: Part 1 governs individual components; Part 2 governs the characteristics of the system as a whole and toxicological safety. In practice Part 2 is not applied: there are no systems certified to Part 2, and there are no accredited testing bodies capable of implementing its requirements.

Moreover, the requirements of Parts 1 and 2 are internally contradictory: achieving the extinguishing performance required by Part 1 leads in practice to exceedance of the temperature and toxicity thresholds set by Part 2. A norm that cannot be satisfied simultaneously is, in operational terms, untestable.

Throughout the period EN 15276 has been in force, there is no recorded instance in which it was applied as an implemented test methodology confirming conformity at the level of the system. There is no applied basis of comparison — and therefore building a new norm “through differences from the existing one” is methodologically impossible.

1.3 The procedural status of NFPA 2010

NFPA 2010 is the antecedent private standard from which ISO 15779 and EN 15276 are structurally derived. The procedural status of its current edition is not confirmed by the public record. The public archive of the NFPA Standards Council for the period 2020–2026 contains no record sufficient to confirm that the NFPA 2010-2025 edition was approved through proper procedure; the preliminary minutes of the Council’s April 2026 meeting do not list that edition at all.

In a letter dated 30 April 2026 the NFPA acknowledged in writing procedural deficiencies in the development of NFPA 2010, including an imbalance in the composition of the technical committee at the time of balloting of the second draft of the 2025 edition. Because EN 15276 and ISO 15779 rest structurally on NFPA 2010, the unconfirmed status of the latter extends to the derivative normative documents.

Certification against this foundation is, in addition, deprived of its object. Under pressure from Impulse Storm’s market-surveillance submissions, UL acknowledged the unfeasibility of Part 2 of EN 15276 and confined the scope of its certification to the product up to the moment of installation. The installed, operating system falls outside that scope.

The certificate attests to the product up to installation, but not to the safety of the operating system for the sake of which it is presented. Certification of the in-service product is thereby deprived of its object and is, in essence, void.

Figure 1

NFPA 2010 United States · private standard · foundation procedural status not confirmed by the public Council archive DERIVED NORMS ISO 15779 international document EN 15276 · Part 1 / Part 2 Part 1 ↔ Part 2: mutual contradiction CE marking market access in the EU INCORPORATION INTO LAW (US) UL 2775 · §1.1, §6.8 normative dependence on NFPA 2010 EPA SNAP · 40 CFR Part 82 incorporation by federal regulation US Coast Guard (USCG) State fire marshals A single private document with an unconfirmed procedural status forms the normative foundation for the entire transatlantic superstructure.
Figure 1. The architecture of normative dependency. On the left, the derivative European branch (ISO 15779 → EN 15276 → CE marking); on the right, the cascade of incorporation into United States law (UL 2775 → federal EPA SNAP regulation → agency approvals). Both branches issue from a single node at the apex.
II

The evidentiary basis: government tests and documented deaths

2.1 Government tests of intrinsic toxicity

Commissions of state authorities in four states — the United States, Finland, the United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa — have tested condensed aerosol fire-suppression systems. Their results consistently establish one thing: the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the declared extinguishing performance and the safety thresholds for exhaust-gas temperature and toxicity set by the standards themselves.

United Kingdom
15.11.2019
Maritime administration — MAIB Report 9/2023 (vessel FV Resurgam)Carbon monoxide concentration 9,700–11,600 ppm; temperature 120 °C at 2 m against a declared 75 °C. classification: “very serious marine casualty”
United States
2006
US Coast Guard research centre (cited in MAIB Report 9/2023)Carbon monoxide concentration about 8,000 ppm (0.8 %); oxygen reduced to 19.1 %. measurements in an enclosed volume
South Africa
report P.1225380
Test for substations (state-owned energy company)Discharge temperature 580–680 °C — incompatible with the UL 2775 §26 requirement of non-ignition of a 4 % stoichiometric propane-air atmosphere (propane autoignition ≈ 470 °C). pyrotechnic reaction
Finland
26.03.2025
Emergency Services Academy (Pelastusopisto) — protocol PeODno 2025-133The only verifiable full-system comparative programme, carried out under accredited European methodologies. methodologies not provided for in EN 15276 / ISO 15779 / NFPA 2010

The requirement of non-ignition of a propane-air atmosphere and measured discharge temperatures of 580–680 °C are incompatible. The UL 2775 standard sets a threshold that a technology of this class, by its nature, exceeds.

2.2 Documented deaths in the absence of fire

The following are cases of loss of life in occupied spaces where the lethal condition was created by the extinguishing agent itself, not by a fire. All three episodes predate the 2025 issuance.

United Kingdom
15.11.2019
FV Resurgam, Newlyn — one fatality (apprentice engineer)Accidental discharge during installation; engine room. source: UK MAIB, Report 9/2023
Thailand
13.03.2016
Bank head office, Bangkok — eight dead, seven injuredDischarge in a vault; autopsy finding — asphyxiation. source: Bangkok Post, 14 March 2016
Saudi Arabia
10.08.2020
Specialist hospital, Jeddah — one fatalitySystem discharge near an employee; civil defence shut the system down. source: Sabq, 10 August 2020
III

European Commission intervention: scale and rarity

3.1 Twenty years: court rulings and legislative reform

Over the past two decades the relationship between private standards and the law of the European Union has changed chiefly along two lines: through court rulings and through a single wave of legislative reform. Both are systemic in nature and were initiated by the courts or by the legislature, not by an individual technology developer.

Figure 2

RESTORATION OF PUBLIC CONTROL · 2016–2026 2016 James Elliott case C-613/14 CJEU: harmonised standards are part of Union law 2017 Global Garden case T-474/15 General Court: Commission answers for the consequences of publication 2022 Regulation 2022/2480 + Standardisation Strategy decisions on standards — reserved to national bodies 2024 Regulation 2024/3110 Construction Products Reg. reinforced market surveillance, declaration of conformity
Figure 2. In 2016 the Court of Justice of the European Union held, for the first time, that harmonised standards are part of Union law; the 2017 ruling placed responsibility for the consequences of their publication on the Commission. These rulings prompted a review and a slowdown of the entire harmonisation process, the outcome of which was Regulation (EU) 2022/2480 and the new Construction Products Regulation (EU) 2024/3110.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2480, applicable from 9 July 2023, established that decisions on the acceptance, refusal and execution of standardisation requests, on new work items, and on the adoption, revision and withdrawal of European standards are taken exclusively by representatives of the national standardisation bodies — in order to exclude undue influence by actors from outside the Union. The new Construction Products Regulation (EU) 2024/3110, adopted on 27 November 2024 and in force from 7 January 2025 (main provisions applicable from 8 January 2026), introduces a declaration of performance and conformity, a digital product passport and reinforced market surveillance.

3.2 The scale of the system and the rarity of this case

To gauge how exceptional this initiative is, it is enough to compare it with the ordinary practice of European technical assessment.

583
European Assessment Documents (EADs) developed by the end of 2021
10,519
European Technical Assessments (ETAs) issued on their basis
≈45
Technical Assessment Bodies (TABs) in the EOTA network
2
court rulings in twenty years that changed the legal status of private standards in the EU

European Assessment Documents are, with rare exceptions, requested by a manufacturer to certify a single product not yet covered by a harmonised standard. The nine-month procedure for preparing them presupposes an existing methodological basis. The interventions of the past two decades, by contrast, arose at the level of the Court and the legislature and were systemic in nature.

There is no comparable case in the public record in which a single enterprise both (i) initiated the development of an entirely new class of products through a national Technical Assessment Body and (ii), on the basis of documented safety findings, prompted the involvement of the European Commission through the internal-market mechanism. The present case combines both vectors.

IV

The solution: a European standard built on verifiability

A new European standard is being developed in the form of a European Assessment Document under the Construction Products Regulation (EU) 2024/3110, carried out by the German Institute for Construction Technology as the responsible Technical Assessment Body. The standard is built not on a reference to declared data but on publicly reproducible test methodologies: determining extinguishing performance together with measuring the concentrations of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and suspended particulates, and the temperature of the exhaust gases, under a defined fire load. None of these methodologies is provided for or described in EN 15276, ISO 15779 or NFPA 2010.

The matter is before the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). This model is thus set against the private commercial model not rhetorically but structurally — through the source of the norm, the procedure, and the verifiability of the result.

Figure 3 · Two models of standard-setting

Private commercial model

NFPA · UL · current practice

  • Accelerated publication without reproducible system-level testing
  • Certification on the basis of declared and third-party data
  • Internally contradictory thresholds that cannot be met simultaneously
  • Procedural status not confirmed by the public record
  • Documented deaths in occupied spaces

European public-law model

EAD · Construction Products Regulation 2024/3110

  • A standard through a responsible Technical Assessment Body
  • Publicly reproducible test methodologies
  • Joint measurement of performance, toxicity and temperature
  • Market surveillance and European Commission involvement
  • Traceability of the result and a declaration of conformity
Figure 3. The difference between the two models lies not in the rigour of the text but in the source of the norm, the procedure for its adoption, and the verifiability of the result.
V

A joint effort of Germany and Finland

This initiative is not a unilateral proposal. From the outset it rests on the institutions of two member states of the European Union, each performing a defined and verifiable function within it.

Germany — the institutional procedure

The German Institute for Construction Technology (Deutsches Institut für Bautechnik, DIBt) in Berlin is the Technical Assessment Body conducting the procedure for developing a European Assessment Document and the subsequent European Technical Assessment (ETA) under the Construction Products Regulation (EU) 2024/3110. The procedure was initiated in late 2025, went through substantive engagement in 2026, and is ongoing. The legal and procedural framework of the future standard is thereby provided by an authorised institution of a member state of the Union.

Finland — the verifiable test

The Emergency Services Academy Finland (Pelastusopisto) carried out the only verifiable full-system comparative test (protocol PeODno 2025-133, 2025) under accredited European methodologies for determining extinguishing performance and safety parameters. That report constitutes the sole verifiable starting basis for building a new standard in technical terms.

The German institution provides the procedure; the Finnish one provides the verifiable test basis. The initiative is European in its participants from the outset, not the proposal of a single actor.

VI

Conclusion

A private standard whose procedural status is not confirmed by the public record, which is internally contradictory and is refuted by government tests and by documented deaths in the absence of fire, cannot remain the basis of European product law. To preserve such a position is to entrench commercial circulation in place of safety control.

The adequate response is not a point amendment to the existing norm but a new European standard, built on publicly reproducible methodologies and developed together with the European Commission. Work on it is already under way through the institutions of Germany and Finland, and it stands within two decades of restoring public control over standardisation in the European Union.

We are open to partnership

We invite cooperation from regulatory and market-surveillance authorities, technical assessment and accreditation bodies, research institutions and responsible industry participants who share the objective of restoring verifiable, public-interest safety assessment.

A full set of test documentation and the regulatory analysis is made available to any interested party for independent verification.

Impulse Storm Ltd.
70 Conduit Street, London W1S 2GF, United Kingdom
fire@impulse-storm.com  ·  impulse-storm.com

Sources and notes

  1. Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-613/14 (James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited), judgment of 27 October 2016.
  2. General Court of the European Union, Case T-474/15 (Global Garden Products Italy v European Commission), judgment of 26 January 2017.
  3. Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 on European standardisation; Regulation (EU) 2022/2480 (applicable from 9 July 2023); European Union Standardisation Strategy, 2022.
  4. Regulation (EU) 2024/3110 (Construction Products Regulation), adopted 27 November 2024; in force 7 January 2025; main provisions applicable from 8 January 2026.
  5. European Organisation for Technical Assessment (EOTA): data on European Assessment Documents and European Technical Assessments, Annual Report 2021.
  6. UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), Report 9/2023 (vessel FV Resurgam).
  7. Siam Commercial Bank, Bangkok, 13 March 2016 — press reporting (Bangkok Post; The National). Eight dead, asphyxiation; Pyrogen aerosol system.
  8. King Faisal Specialist Hospital, Jeddah, 10 August 2020 — press reporting (Sabq; Makkah News). Death of an employee on discharge of the aerosol system.
Impulse Storm Ltd.
Position paper · June 2026
Jurisdictions: European Union · Germany · Finland
impulse-storm.com

This document is a position statement of Impulse Storm Ltd. References to organisations, standards, court cases and legislative acts rest on public sources and on the documented results of the company’s own regulatory analysis. The document is intended for the good-faith discussion of safety and standardisation in the public interest.